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When we first undertook the task of reviewing Derek Bickerton’s (2009) Adam’s 
Tongue (AT), we had to make a decision about what points we should focus our 
attention on. Bickerton, in his reply, finds it amazing that we almost exclusively 
focus on “incidental uses of biology and NCT” (p. 128). Indeed, we eventually 
decided against articulating our criticisms along the communicative vs. non-com-
municative debate for the reasons we already expressed in the review (hence-
forth SM), but also on the (implicit) assumption that any account of language 
origins should be based on a sound biological framework, that biolinguistics is 
about taking biology seriously, and that, should any attempt at an explanation of 
the origins of language be based on a wrong or inadequate use of biological 
notions, it would immediately be flawed, independently of how the commu-
nicative vs. non-communicative debate is eventually resolved. It appears that, at 
least as far as this point is concerned, Bickerton agrees with us: “[I]f I had really 
gone wrong here, the book’s major contentions would be seriously flawed” (p. 
128) And we think they are. That’s the reason why we concentrated on them. But 
also because we do not think there are any biologically incidental issues in 
biology; nor in biolinguistics, for that matter.  
 AT is not “a textbook of evolutionary biology nor a primer in NCT” (p. 128) 
—true, but this is no excuse for making a sloppy use of these disciplines. In fact, 
with our selection of quotes we tried to show that, in spite of the fact that all the 
appropriate leitmotivs of NCT appear in the book, what Bickerton is actually 
advocating for in AT is a necessity scenario not too different from the one 
suggested by Marx and Engels more that 150 years ago. The main features of this 
necessity scenario are: (i) ecological niches preexist the organisms that enter 
them; (ii) the environment is sufficiently structured to create the need for a new 
character; (iii) if the organism in the niche is not constrained by its biology (more 
about this below) it will respond by developing the (behavioral) character that 
satisfies the need imposed by the environment; (iv) a feedback process ensues, 
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not too different from reinforcement in behaviorist psychology, that eventually 
fixes the character; and (v) in this feedback process genes and environment inter-
act and this interaction is mediated by behavior. 
 From this follows that any organism could develop language should it 
enter the appropriate niche and should it have the appropriate biology. This last 
phrase, which is ours, not Bickerton’s, essentially means that the organism must 
not be variation-limited (Számadó & Szathmáry 2006), i.e. that its biology must 
not include constraints that would make this change impossible. This probably is, 
by the way, what, according to Bickerton, is supposed to explain why ants and 
bees don’t have language, although, without knowing exactly what these bio-
logical constraints are, we cannot rule out the possibility, given that they seem to 
occupy the appropriate niche, that they will eventually develop it. 
 Now, this is not NCT—we reaffirm our contention. It is, as we pointed out 
in SM, at its best, a variety of adaptationism; see our quote by Lewontin in SM, 
but also the following: 
 
Whereas classical evolutionary theory sees the organism as the key that has 
to fit into the environment’s lock, both ecological developmental biology 
and niche construction see interactions between them. Niche construction 
emphasizes the ability of the organism to alter its environment; eco-devo 
emphasizes the ability of the environment to alter the developing organism.  
(Laland et al. 2008: 550). 
 
At its worst, with the introduction of ‘necessity’ in whole picture, it is a modern 
version of Marxian or Rousseaunian environmentalism: 
 
[L]’usage de la parole s’établit ou se perfectionne insensiblement dans le 
sein de chaque famille, et l’on peut conjecturer encore comment diverses 
causes particulières purent étendre le langage, et en accélerer le progrès en 
le rendant plus necéssaire. Des grandes inondations ou des tremblements de 
terre environnèrent d’eaux ou de précipices des cantons habités; de 
révolutions du globe detachèrent et coupèrent en îles des portions du 
continent. On conçoit qu’entre des hommes ainsi rapprochés, et forcés de 
vivre ensemble, il dût se former un idiome commun plutôt qu’entre ceux qui 
erroient librement dans les forêts de la terre ferme.   (Rousseau 1755: 109) 
 
 The reason, again as we pointed out in SM, is causation. Thus, even if 
Bickerton appears to be willing to accept that development plays some role in 
evolutionary processes, he explicitly declares his skepticism (e.g. AT: 130) for 
evo–devo explanations, at least in the case of language origins. Indeed, given the 
way he conceives of his model, developmental processes are not regarded as in-
dependent causes, but rather, by appealing to the variation-limited vs. selection-
limited dichotomy (Számadó & Szathmáry 2006), he is implicitly accepting that 
the ability of these processes to constrain is fully explained by natural selection, 
that is they are just the proximate manifestation of some ultimate, exogenous, 
cause, namely natural selection and/or behavior. 
 Compare now this picture with the following: 
 
An equally tenable approach, which we advocate, is to adopt ‘reciprocal 
causation’ in evolutionary explanations, in which characteristics of orga-
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nisms are regarded as caused by interacting bouts of selection and con-
struction […]. One important ramification of reciprocal causation is that it is 
philosophically sound to argue that developmental processes can be evolu-
tionarily causal, as they are not regarded as fully caused by earlier selection 
on genes.                (Laland et al. 2008: 552) 
 
So much for our sins of commision. 
 As for our sins of omission, it was not our intention to use SM as a means 
to defend our own views, since we have already done that, in print, elsewhere 
(Balari & Lorenzo 2008, 2009a, 2009b). However, since Bickerton accuses us of 
using SM as some kind of diversion strategy, we would like to say something in 
this connection. And we will start by saying that, no, we are not crypto-
Chomskyans garrisoned in the Hauser-Chomsky-Fitch barracks. Quite to the 
contrary. We have raised a number of criticisms to the HCF paper (Hauser et al. 
2002); thus, for example, in Balari & Lorenzo (2008: 6) we concluded that:  
 
[O]ur proposal is compatible […] with the idea that the computational re-
gime subserving the human language faculty also subserves other, non-
linguistic aspects of human mentality, and, consequently that the narrow 
faculty of language of [HCF] is, in fact, not specific to language. 
 
And in Balari & Lorenzo (2009b: 45) we wrote:  
 
We only slightly qualified [HCF’s] assertion, pointing at evidence which 
may indicate the presence of computational systems with degrees of com-
plexity similar to the FL but associated with cognitive capacities that give 
rise to such disparate behaviors as nest building. 
 
To which we could add (see Balari & Lorenzo 2009a) that HCF is often read and 
interpreted as a defense of the specifically human and specifically linguistic 
character of FLN, the computational aspect of language. This interpretation, we 
believe, is correct; but only partly correct. HCF also, and perhaps above all, is a 
defense of the singularity of language qua communication system and, in this 
sense, a particular application of the research program on the evolution of the 
communicative function developed by Hauser (1997), whose explicitly declared 
main goal is to determine the causes underlying variation in natural 
communication systems, human linguistic communication included. Indeed, one 
should read as a direct appeal to this framework the fact that one of the basic 
assumptions of HFC is that, despite the conspicuous discontinuity among the 
systems on which communication is based in different species, these systems are 
nothing else but several instantiations of a unique but highly diversified organic 
function (2002: 1569; especially, fig. 1). HCF constitutes, then, no more and no 
less than an attempt to provide an answer for the particular case of linguistic 
communication within a broader research agenda seeking the causal factors 
responsible for the piecemeal diversification of the communicative function in its 
evolution within different species (Hauser 1997: 1–2).  
 Now, Bickerton attributes to us the opinion that “the debate over the initial 
emergence of language is now ‘sterile’ and too ideological to be pursued further” 
(p. 128) but our opinion, clearly expressed in SM, is that the discussion about 
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whether language has its origins in some form of ancestral communication or not is 
sterile and too ideological, which is quite different. To extend a bit this idea, 
given that we have been given to opportunity to do so (but, again, see Balari & 
Lorenzo 2009a), we contend that language does not have its origins in some form 
of ancestral communication; it cannot have its origins in any form of ancestral 
communication. The reason is, ultimately, conceptual: There is nothing in nature 
corresponding to what we ordinarily call ‘communication’. Pheromone trans-
mission in ants, the feigned wing injuries of golden plovers, the alarm calls of 
vervet monkeys, and human language are such an heterogeneous collection of 
phenomena that cannot in any sense be considered a ‘natural class’. In a nutshell, 
our point of view is that ‘communication’ does not refer to a natural class that 
can be the object of evolutionary process (see also Klopfer 1973). Bickerton (1990) 
could have delivered evolutionary linguistics from this ‘communicative fallacy’ 
—directly instantiated in research programs like that of Hauser (1997), and 
indirectly, in that of HCF—but the truth is that, twenty years after, not only the 
fallacy still pervades this discipline, but also Bickerton has now become one of its 
most vehement advocates.  
 Finally, Bickerton reproaches us of not having addressed in SM what, in his 
opinion, is one the major contributions of AT: The explanation why the human 
mind is so radically different from other animal minds. He contends that it is 
language that created it and not the reverse, that is, he contends that the 
evolution of the human mind could not have given rise to something like 
language. True, we did not touch on this issue. It would not have been 
appropriate, since this is not really one of the topics developed in the book. As 
correctly pointed out by Bickerton in his response, “[AT] is about the transition 
from the alingual state that characterizes all other species to something that 
might qualify as a genuine precursor of language, thereby opening the road for 
[…] the subsequent development of true language” (p. 128)—so AT’s evolu-
tionary perspective is exhausted with what Bickerton calls a “genuine precursor 
of language” and it does not make any genuinely new contribution concerning 
the role of ‘true language’ in the evolutionary modeling of the ‘true human 
mind’. 
 Our suggestion to the interested reader, in order to compensate for AT’s 
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